Appendix: American Bar Association Resolution by unknown
APPENDIX.FMT.DOC 05/18/99 3:37 PM
APPENDIX*
[page 1] AS APPROVED BY THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
SECTION OF LITIGATION
SECTION OF TORT AND INSURANCE PRACTICE
COMMISSION ON MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW
MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASSOCIATION
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association [“ABA” or
“Association”] calls upon each jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment not
to carry out the death penalty until the jurisdiction implements policies and
procedures that are consistent with the following longstanding American Bar
Association policies intended to (1) ensure that death penalty cases are admin-
istered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due process, and (2) minimize
the risk that innocent persons may be executed:
(i) Implementing ABA “Guidelines for the Appointment and Per-
formance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases” (adopted Feb. 1989)
and Association policies intended to encourage competency of coun-
sel in capital cases (adopted Feb. 1979, Feb. 1988, Feb. 1990, Aug.
1996);
(ii) Preserving, enhancing, and streamlining state and federal courts’
authority and responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the
merits of constitutional claims in state post-conviction and federal ha-
beas corpus proceedings (adopted Aug. 1982, Feb. 1990);
(iii) Striving to eliminate discrimination in capital sentencing on the
basis of the race of either the victim or the defendant (adopted Aug.
1988, Aug. 1991); and
(iv) Preventing execution of mentally retarded persons (adopted Feb.
1989) and persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of their
offenses (adopted Aug. 1983).
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FURTHER RESOLVED, That in adopting this recommendation, apart
from existing Association policies relating to offenders who are mentally re-
tarded or under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offenses, the
Association takes no position on the death penalty.
[page 2] REPORT**
INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association has adopted numerous policies bearing on
the manner in which the death penalty should be applied in jurisdictions where
it exists.  These policies were adopted in view of the ABA’s extensive experi-
ence with the administration of the death penalty and in light of several ABA-
sponsored studies.  The policies concern: (1) competent counsel in capital cases;
(2) proper processes for adjudicating claims in capital cases (including the
availability of federal habeas corpus); (3) racial discrimination in the admini-
stration of capital punishment; and (4) the execution of juveniles and mentally
retarded persons.
The time has now come for the ABA to take additional decisive action with
regard to capital punishment.  Not only have the ABA’s existing policies gen-
erally not been implemented, but also, and more critically, the federal and state
governments have been moving in a direction contrary to these policies.  The
most recent and most dramatic moves, both strongly opposed by the ABA,
have come in the form of laws enacted by Congress in 1996.  Federal courts al-
ready are construing one law to significantly curtail the availability of federal
habeas corpus to death row inmates, even when they have been convicted or
sentenced to death as a result of serious, prejudicial constitutional violations.
Another law completely withdraws federal funding from the Post-Conviction
Defender Organizations that have handled many post-conviction cases and that
have mentored many other lawyers who have represented death row inmates in
such proceedings.
These two recently enacted laws, together with other federal and state ac-
tions taken since the ABA adopted its policies on capital punishment, have re-
sulted in a situation in which fundamental due process is now systematically
lacking in capital cases.  Accordingly, in order to effectuate its existing policies,
the ABA should now call upon jurisdictions with capital punishment not to
carry out the death penalty until these policies are implemented.  Of course,
individual lawyers differ in their views on the death penalty in principle and on
its constitutionality.  However, it should now be apparent to all of us in the pro-
fession that the administration of the death penalty has become so seriously
flawed that capital punishment should not be implemented without adherence
to the various applicable ABA policies.
                                                          
** American Bar Ass’n, Report No. 107 (Feb. 1997).  This report was submitted with Recom-
mendation No. 107 (Feb. 1997).  Reports accompanying recommendations are not official ABA policy,
but are provided to support the recommendation.
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BACKGROUND
The backdrop for this Recommendation is the two decades of jurisprudence
and legislation since the United States Supreme Court upheld new death pen-
alty statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,1 [page 3] after having invalidated earlier
death penalty statutes in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia.2  In Furman, the Court
believed that then-existing state statutes failed to properly balance the need to
ensure overall consistency in capital sentencing with the need to ensure fairness
in individual cases.  Four years later, in Gregg, the Court concluded that new
state statutes’ special procedural requirements for capital prosecutions pro-
vided a means by which the states would achieve that balance.
However, two decades after Gregg, it is apparent that the efforts to forge a
fair capital punishment jurisprudence have failed.3  Today, administration of
the death penalty, far from being fair and consistent, is instead a haphazard
maze of unfair practices with no internal consistency.  To a substantial extent,
this situation has developed because death penalty jurisdictions generally have
failed to implement the types of policies called for by existing ABA policies.
The pervasive unfairness of the capital punishment system that has evolved
since Gregg has led two of the Supreme Court Justices who were part of the
majority in Gregg to regret having upheld the death penalty’s constitutionality.
Retired Justice Lewis Powell, in a 1991 interview, expressed his doubt whether
the death penalty could be administered in a way that was truly fair and stated
that, in retrospect, his greatest regret was that he had voted to uphold the con-
stitutionality of capital punishment in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987),
and other cases.4  Justice Harry Blackmun expressed similar concerns in his
1994 dissent in McFarland v. Scott:
When we execute a capital defendant in this country, we rely on the belief that the in-
dividual was guilty, and was convicted and sentenced after a fair trial, to justify the
imposition of state-sponsored killing. . . .  My 24 years of overseeing the imposition of
the death penalty from this court have left me in grave doubt whether this reliance is
justified and whether the constitutional requirement of competent legal counsel for
capital defendants is being fulfilled.5
The already deplorable state of affairs noted by Justices Powell and Black-
mun is exacerbated by three other, very recent developments.  First, although
certain states have begun [page 4] to implement some ABA policies, more
                                                          
1. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 357 (1995) (reporting that
“[v]irtually no one thinks that the constitutional regulation of capital punishment has been a success”);
see also James S. Liebman & Jonathan M. Moses, Fatal Distortion: The Chronic Making and Unmaking
of Death Penalty Law (publication forthcoming).
4. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-52 (1994) (quoting Justice
Powell).
5. 512 U.S. 1256, 1264 (1994).
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states are moving in the opposite direction—undermining or eliminating impor-
tant procedural safeguards that the ABA has found to be essential.
Second, Congress recently enacted legislation that makes it significantly
more difficult for the federal courts to adjudicate meritorious federal constitu-
tional claims in capital cases.  Title I of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 establishes deadlines for filing federal habeas petitions,
places limits on federal evidentiary hearings into the facts underlying federal
constitutional claims, sets timetables for federal court action, limits the avail-
ability of appellate review, establishes even more demanding restrictions on
second or successive applications for federal relief, and, in some instances, ap-
parently bars the federal courts from awarding relief on the basis of federal
constitutional violations where state courts have erred in concluding that no
such violation occurred.
While the ABA has consistently supported meaningful habeas corpus re-
forms, this new federal legislation instead dramatically undermines the federal
courts’ capacity to adjudicate federal constitutional claims in a fair and efficient
manner.  Indeed, that may itself be unconstitutional, as the ABA already has
asserted in an amicus brief.  Congress’[s] adoption of the 1996 Act only under-
scores the extent of this country’s failure to fashion a workable and just system
for administering capital punishment.
Third, and also contrary to longstanding ABA policies, Congress has ended
funding for Post-Conviction Defender Organizations (PCDO’s), which have
handled many capital post-conviction cases and have recruited and supported
volunteer lawyers in these cases for many indigent death row prisoners.  The
ABA had a major role in supporting the creation of the PCDO’s.
Together, these three developments have brought the adjudication of capi-
tal cases to the point of crisis.  Unless existing ABA policies are now imple-
mented, many more prisoners will be executed under circumstances that are in-
consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate, articulated in Furman and
Gregg, that the death penalty be fairly and justly administered.
The ABA has worked hard to foster the fair and just administration of capi-
tal punishment.  The ABA’s Post-[C]onviction Death Penalty Representation
Project has provided expert advice and counsel to jurisdictions attempting to
improve the delivery of legal services to death row prisoners.  In addition, it has
recruited more than 400 volunteer attorneys to represent indigent death row
inmates.  The Project also has assisted in the creation of PCDO’s and strongly
opposed the successful effort to cut off their federal funding.  The ABA has tes-
tified in support of the Racial Justice Act and actively opposed the kind of ha-
beas corpus restrictions enacted in 1996.  And the ABA has conducted and
supported a variety of training programs for lawyers and judges in capital cases
and has advocated detailed standards for capital defense counsel.  Also, various
ABA groups have sponsored numerous education programs examining the
fairness of capital punishment as implemented.
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[page 5] The ABA’s efforts have had some impact.  But recent develop-
ments have made the impact of incompetent counsel and the instances of un-
corrected due process violations substantially greater, and matters are likely to
become worse in the future.  It is essential that the ABA now forcefully urge
that executions not occur unless each person being executed has had competent
counsel and the due process protections that the ABA has long advocated.
I.  Competent Counsel
The ABA is especially well positioned to identify the professional legal
services that should be available to capital defendants and death row inmates.
The Association has shouldered that responsibility by conducting studies and
adopting policies dating back nearly twenty years.  Seven years ago, the ABA
recommended that “competent and adequately compensated” counsel should
be provided “at all stages of capital . . . litigation,” including trial, direct review,
collateral proceedings in both state and federal court, and certiorari proceed-
ings in the U.S. Supreme Court.6  To implement that basic recommendation,
the ABA said that death penalty jurisdictions should establish organizations to
“recruit, select, train, monitor, support, and assist” attorneys representing capi-
tal clients.
Eight years ago, the ABA published the “Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases” and urged all jurisdic-
tions that employ the death penalty to adopt them.7  Those guidelines call for
the appointment of two experienced attorneys at each stage of a capital case.8
Appointments are to be made by a special appointing authority or committee,
charged to identify and recruit lawyers with specified professional credentials,
experience, and skills.9  The guidelines make it clear that ordinary professional
qualifications are inadequate to measure what is needed from counsel in “the
specialized practice of capital representation.”  To ensure that the lawyers as-
signed to capital cases are able to do the work required, the guidelines state
that attorneys should receive a “reasonable rate of hourly compensation which
. . . reflects the extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty [page 6]
litigation.”  Concomitantly, counsel should be provided with the time and
                                                          
6. American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1990).
7. American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1989).
8. The ABA previously had urged the federal government to adopt similar procedures and stan-
dards for counsel appointed to represent death row prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
See American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1988).  Before that, the ABA
had urged the U.S. Supreme Court and the Congress to provide for competent counsel to handle cer-
tiorari proceedings and petitions for clemency before the Court.  See American Bar Ass’n, Resolution
of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1979).
9. In addition, the guidelines set forth the way in which counsel in a capital case should perform
various defense functions, from plea negotiations, through jury selection, the trial and sentencing
phases, and post-conviction proceedings.
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funding necessary for proper investigations, expert witnesses, and other support
services.10
No state has fully embraced the system the ABA has prescribed for capital
trials.  To the contrary, grossly unqualified and undercompensated lawyers who
have nothing like the support necessary to mount an adequate defense are of-
ten appointed to represent capital clients.  In case after case, decisions about
who will die and who will live turn not on the nature of the offense the defen-
dant is charged with committing, but rather on the nature of the legal represen-
tation the defendant receives.11
Jurisdictions that employ the death penalty have proven unwilling to estab-
lish the kind of legal services system that is necessary to ensure that defendants
charged with capital offenses receive the defense they require.  Many death
penalty states have no working public defender programs, relying instead upon
scattershot methods for selecting and supporting defense counsel in capital
cases.12  For example, some states simply assign lawyers at random from a gen-
eral list—a scheme destined to identify attorneys who lack the necessary quali-
fications and, worse still, regard their assignments as a burden.  Other jurisdic-
tions employ “contract” systems, which typically channel indigent defense
business to attorneys who offer the lowest bids.13  Other states use public de-
fender schemes that appear on the surface to be more promising, but prove in
practice to be just as ineffective.14
                                                          
10. In August 1996, the ABA adopted a policy regarding the appropriate representation of mili-
tary defendants facing execution.  To date, the military has failed to implement this policy.
11. See Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation’s Death Belt, NAT’L L.J.,
June 11, 1990, at 30 (reporting the conclusions of an extensive six-state survey: capital trials are “more
like a flip of the coin than a delicate balancing of the scales” because defense counsel are “ill trained,
unprepared . . . [and] grossly underpaid”).
12. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime, but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
13. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitu-
tional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 679-80 (1986).
14. See Bright, supra note 12, at 1849-52, summarizing the current situation as follows (citations
omitted):
The structure of indigent defense not only varies among states, it varies within many states
from county to county.  Some localities employ a combination of programs.  All of these ap-
proaches have several things in common.  They evince the gross underfunding that pervades
indigent defense.  They are unable to attract and keep experienced and qualified attorneys
because of lack of compensation and overwhelming workloads.  Just when lawyers reach the
point when they have handled enough cases to begin avoiding basic mistakes, they leave
criminal practice and are replaced by other young, inexperienced lawyers who are even less
able to deal with the overwhelming caseloads.  Generally, no standards are employed for as-
signment of cases to counsel or for the performance of counsel.  And virtually no resources
are provided for investigative and expert assistance or defense counsel training.
The situation has further deteriorated in the last few years.  This is largely due to the in-
creased complexity of cases and the increase in the number of cases resulting from expanded
resources for police and prosecution and the lack of a similar increase, and perhaps even a
decline, in funding for defense programs.
Moreover, at an ABA Annual Meeting program in 1995, Scharlette Holdman described case after case
of incompetent representation by counsel appointed by judges in California and other Western states,
in which compensation is typically greater than that in most other states with capital punishment.  See
Symposium, Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 523, 581 (1996).
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[page 7] It is scarcely surprising that the results of poor lawyering are often
literally fatal for capital defendants.  Systematic studies reveal the depth of the
problems nationwide and thus supply the hard data to support reasoned policy-
making.15  Case after case all too frequently reveals the inexperience of lawyers
appointed to represent capital clients.  In Tyler v. Kemp16 and Paradis v.
Arave,17 state trial courts assigned capital cases to young lawyers who had
passed the bar only a few months earlier; in Bell v. Watkins,18 a state trial court
appointed a lawyer who had never finished a criminal trial of any kind; and in
Leatherwood v. State,19 yet another trial court allowed a third-year law student
to handle most of a capital trial.
[page 8] Other cases demonstrate that defense counsel in capital cases often
are incapable of handling such cases properly.  In Smith v. State,20 defense coun-
sel asked for extra time between the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital
case in order to read the state death penalty statute for the first time.  In Frey v.
Fulcomer,21 defense counsel, in purported compliance with a state statute, lim-
ited his presentation of mitigating evidence.  Unbeknownst to defense counsel,
that statute had been held unconstitutional three years earlier precisely because
it restricted counsel’s ability to develop mitigating evidence.  In Ross v. Kemp,22
one defense attorney advanced a weak alibi theory, while his co-counsel
mounted an inconsistent mental incompetency defense that necessarily con-
ceded that the defendant had participated in the offense.23  In Romero v. Ly-
naugh,24 defense counsel declined to offer any evidence at all during the penalty
phase of a capital case, and then made the following brief and ineffective clos-
ing argument:  “You are an extremely intelligent jury.  You’ve got that man’s
life in your hands.  You can take it or not.  That’s all I have to say.”  The jury,
in its turn, sentenced the defendant to death.
In Messer v. Kemp,25 defense counsel presented very little of the mitigating
evidence available, made no objections at all, then essentially told the jury that
the death penalty was appropriate.  That defendant, too, was sentenced to die.
                                                          
Thus, as the ABA has recognized, the problem is not merely underfunding.  It is also the appointment
by judges of attorneys who lack either the expertise or the experience necessary to represent a capital
defendant effectively.
15. Over the years, both the ABA and local bar and legislative groups have commissioned such
studies.  In one instance, illustrative of other states’ practices as well, researchers found that Texas
typically does not use central appointing authorities to choose counsel in death penalty cases, does not
monitor the performance of assigned counsel in capital cases, and does not adequately compensate ap-
pointed counsel or reimburse them sufficiently for support services.  See SPANGENBERG GROUP, A
STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN TEXAS (1993).
16. 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985).
17. 954 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1992).
18. 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982).
19. 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989).
20. 581 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
21. 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992).
22. 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990).
23. See Bright, supra note 12 (listing these illustrative cases and dozens more).
24. 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989).
25. 831 F.2d 946 (11th Cir. 1987).
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In Young v. Kemp,26 the defense counsel was himself so dependent on drugs
during trial that, as even he later admitted, he mounted only the semblance of a
defense.  His client received the death penalty, but then chanced to see the de-
fense lawyer thereafter in a prison yard.  The attorney had, in the interim, been
convicted and sentenced on state and federal drug charges.
Even when experienced and competent counsel are available in capital
cases, they often are unable to render adequate service for want of essential
funding to pay the costs of investigations and expert witnesses.27  In some rural
counties in Texas, an appointed attorney [page 9] receives no more than $800
to represent a capital defendant.28  Similar limits are in place in other states.  In
Virginia, the hourly rate for capital defense services works out to about $13.29
In an Alabama case, the lawyer appointed to represent a capital defendant in a
widely publicized case was allowed a total of $500 to finance his work, including
any investigations and expert services needed.  With that budget, it is hardly
surprising that the attorney conducted no investigation at all.30
Poorly prepared and supported trial lawyers typically do a poor job.  When
they do recognize points to be explored and argued, they often fail to follow
through in a professional manner.  And when they do not recognize what needs
to be done, they do nothing at all or they take actions that are inimical to the
needs of their clients.  The result of such inadequacies in representation is that
counsel often fail to present crucial facts.  They also may fail to raise crucial le-
gal issues, causing their clients to forfeit their opportunity to explore those is-
sues later—in any court.  In one recent case, appointed defense counsel
scarcely did anything to represent his client at trial and, along the way, ne-
glected to raise three significant constitutional claims.  The federal court that
reviewed the case could not consider any of these omitted claims because, un-
der state law, counsel’s numerous defaults barred their later consideration.31
The same pattern is repeated with respect to the legal services available for
the appellate and post-conviction stages of capital cases.  State appellate court
standards for adequate representation under state law are extraordinarily low.
These courts sometimes dispose of capital appeals on the basis of inadequate
briefs containing only a few pages of argument—and, in so doing, often rely on
defense counsel’s “default” at trial to avoid considering constitutional claims on
                                                          
26. No. 85-98-2-MAC (M.D. Ga. 1985).
27. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 15, at 159; see also Anthony Paduano & Clive A.S.
Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 281 (1991) (providing a national survey).
28. See Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star Counsel, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 1990, at
34.  In one celebrated Texas case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that an appointed attorney
had received only $11.84 per hour in a capital case and, at that price, had rendered particularly dread-
ful service to his indigent client.  That, said the court, explained much of the problem.  “[T]he justice
system got only what it paid for.”  Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
29. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 366 (1993).
30. See Deposition of Richard Bell at 24-25, Grayson v. State (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Ala., Oct.
10, 1991).  The state payment limit is now $1,000.
31. See Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1994).
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the merits.32  As for post-conviction, an ABA Task Force developed an enor-
mous body of evidence in 1990 demonstrating that prisoners sentenced to death
typically receive even less effective [page 10] representation in post-conviction
than at the trial stage.33  The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitu-
tional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, even in capital cases.34
Although many states and the federal government once funded Post-
Conviction Defender Organizations, which recruited lawyers for death row in-
mates at the post-conviction stage and represented others themselves, today
many of those centers have been forced to close because Congress has elimi-
nated their federal funding.35
The federal courts generally have not rectified this situation.  The standard
for effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is so egregiously
low that the potential for relief in federal habeas corpus on such grounds is al-
most always more theoretical [than] real.  The federal courts found the
“services” rendered in the Romero, Messer, and Young cases, cited above, to be
“effective” for constitutional purposes—and, accordingly, all three prisoners
were executed.
Compounding the effect of incompetent representation of capital defen-
dants and death row inmates is improper representation of the state by prose-
cutors inadequately trained in avoiding constitutional violations.  In describing
this combined impact, former Pennsylvania Attorney General Ernest Preate
said at an ABA Annual Meeting program, “[I]n too many capital cases, there is
ineffective assistance of counsel on both sides. . . .  [T]he defense counsel’s inef-
fective assistance of counsel is not necessarily a mistake that the defense coun-
sel originally made, but a mistake by the prosecutor.  The prosecutor did some-
thing he or she shouldn’t have done and the defense counsel failed to object or
failed to take advantage of it.”36  Unfortunately, relief rarely is granted under
any of the circumstances described above.
II.  Proper Processes
[page 11] The ABA consistently has sought to ensure that adequate proce-
dures are in place to determine whether a capital sentence has been entered in
violation of federal law.  No other organization has monitored the federal ha-
                                                          
32. See Bright, supra note 12, at 1843 & n.55.
33. See American Bar Ass’n, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death
Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1990).
34. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
35. See generally The Crisis in Capital Representation, 51 THE RECORD 169, 187-91 (Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Mar. 4, 1996). The PCDO’s were extremely effective.  In 1989,
Chief Judge Tjoflat of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit told the ABA Task
Force that the Resource Centers were “indispensable.”  American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33, at 73.  In
1994, Judge Arthur L. Alarcon of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote that the PCDO’s
were “critical” to the efficient processing of capital cases.  Memorandum to Judges Cox and Cedar-
baum (Dec. 7, 1994), cited in The Crisis in Capital Representation, supra, at 188-89.  Nevertheless, they
were defunded.
36. Symposium, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency & Due Process in Death Penalty
Cases, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21 (1994) (comments of Ernest Preate).
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beas system more closely, developed greater expertise regarding that system’s
strengths and weaknesses, or offered more detailed prescriptions for reform.
Fourteen years ago, the ABA publicly opposed three bills then pending in
Congress that would have dramatically restricted the federal courts’ ability to
adjudicate state prisoners’ habeas claims.  At the same time, the ABA pro-
posed alternatives that would have streamlined habeas litigation without un-
dermining the federal courts’ authority and responsibility to exercise independ-
ent judgment on the merits of constitutional claims.37
Since that time, the ABA has been deeply involved in the national debate
over federal habeas—particularly in capital cases.  The ABA task force that
studied the situation in depth created a solid scholarly foundation for its work,
then received written and oral testimony from knowledgeable individuals and
organizations at hearings in several cities.38  In 1990, the ABA House of Dele-
gates adopted a set of recommendations for improving current law that were
based upon the Task Force’s work.39  The recommendations included the prin-
ciples that a death row prisoner should be entitled to a stay of execution in or-
der to complete one round of post-conviction litigation in state and federal
court; that the federal courts should consider claims that were not properly
raised in state court if the reason for the prisoner’s default was counsel’s igno-
rance or neglect; and that a prisoner should be permitted to file a second or
successive federal petition if it raises a new claim that undermines confidence in
his or her guilt or the appropriateness of the death sentence.
Regrettably, none of these recommendations has been generally adopted.
In fact, the Supreme Court has denied death row prisoners the very opportuni-
ties for raising constitutional claims that the ABA has insisted are essential.
Prisoners have not been entitled even to a single stay of execution to maintain
the status quo long enough to complete post-conviction litigation.40  The federal
courts typically have refused to consider claims that were not properly raised in
state court, even if the failure to raise them was due to the ignorance or neglect
of defense counsel.41  And prisoners have often not been allowed to litigate
more than one petition, even if they have [page 12] offered strong evidence of
egregious constitutional violations that they could not have presented earlier.42
The consequence of these legal tangles has been that meritorious constitu-
tional claims often have gone without remedy.  Contrary to popular belief,
most habeas petitions in death penalty cases do not rest on frivolous technicali-
ties.  As Professor James S. Liebman has reported, in 40 percent of all capital
cases, even in the face of all the procedural barriers, death row inmates still
                                                          
37. See American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1982).
38. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.
39. See id.; American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1990).
40. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256 (1994).
41. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
42. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped numerous other door-closing doctrines that restrict death row prisoners’ access to the federal
courts for habeas corpus adjudication.  See Symposium, supra note 36.
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have been able to secure relief due to violations of their basic constitutional
rights.43  The percentage securing relief would be substantially higher if the fed-
eral courts had considered all death row inmates’ claims on their merits.
Yet, in 1996, Congress enacted legislation that will make it even more diffi-
cult for the federal courts to adjudicate federal claims in capital cases.  This
new law, which the ABA vigorously opposed, establishes deadlines for filing
federal habeas petitions, limits on federal evidentiary hearings into the facts
underlying federal claims, timetables for federal court action, limits on the
availability of appellate review, and even more demanding restrictions on sec-
ond or successive applications from a single petitioner.  The new law also con-
tains a provision that, according to the en banc Seventh Circuit (and contrary to
the ABA’s position as amicus curiae), prevents a federal court from awarding
relief on the basis of a claim that the federal court finds to be meritorious if it
concludes that the state court that rejected the claim was not “unreasonably”
wrong in doing so.44
III.  Race Discrimination
In 1988, the ABA adopted a policy of striving to eliminate “discrimination
in capital sentencing on the basis of the race of either the victim or the defen-
dant.”45  Nevertheless, longstanding patterns of racial discrimination remain in
courts across the country.
[page 13] Numerous studies have demonstrated that defendants are more
likely to be sentenced to death if their victims were white rather than black.46
Other studies have shown that in some jurisdictions African Americans tend to
receive the death penalty more often than do white defendants.47  And in
                                                          
43. Memorandum of James S. Liebman (Nov. 22, 1995).
44. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996)[, rev’d, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)].  For a summary
and analysis of the various new habeas corpus provisions, see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
45. American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Aug. 1988).  In addition, the
ABA has urged Congress to “prevent or minimize any disproportionate effects of general federal
death penalty legislation on Native Americans subject to federal jurisdiction.” American Bar Ass’n,
Resolution of the House of Delegates (Aug. 1991).
46. See Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Be
Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 777, 780-83 (1990-91) (summarizing various studies) (this law review article is an adap-
tation of the ABA’s testimony in support of the proposed Racial Justice Act); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES A PATTERN OF
RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S6889-90 (daily ed., May 24, 1990);
Symposium, The Death Penalty in the Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 320-23, 341, 345,
347, 348 (1995) (comments of Laurie Ekstrand & Harriet Ganson in a panel discussion on Race and
the Death Penalty); see also SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989).  In Kentucky, approximately 1,000 African
Americans have been murdered over the past 20 years.  Yet none of the prisoners on that state’s death
row is there for having killed a black victim.  Letter from the Death Penalty Information Center (Apr.
2, 1996).
47. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 399 (1990).
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countless cases, the poor legal services that capital clients receive are rendered
worse still by racist attitudes of defense counsel.48
Justice Blackmun lamented the Court’s failure to fashion an effective
means of preventing the “biases and prejudices that infect society generally”
from influencing “the determination of [page 14] who is sentenced to death.”49
After years of watching race play so large a role in the administration of capital
punishment, he concluded, in part for that reason, that he no longer could find
any execution consistent with the Constitution.  The ABA need not go so far in
order to resolve, as a matter of ABA policy, that executions should cease until
effective mechanisms are developed for eliminating the corrosive effects of ra-
cial prejudice in capital cases.
The Supreme Court, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the systemic
pattern of racial discrimination in capital sentencing, invited legislative action
to deal with this situation.50  Thereafter, the ABA, in conformance with a reso-
lution adopted by the House of Delegates in August 1988, supported enact-
ment of the Racial Justice Act, a measure designed to create a remedy for such
racial discrimination.51  Although the House of Representatives twice has ap-
proved the Racial Justice Act, the full Congress has not enacted it.  Accord-
ingly, these patterns of racial discrimination remain unrectified.  Ironically, Jus-
tice Powell, the author of the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision rejecting the
constitutional challenge discussed above, has now indicated that he regrets his
participation in that decision (as well as in other decisions upholding the death
penalty) more than anything else during his tenure on the court.52
IV.  Execution of Mentally Retarded Individuals and Juveniles
The ABA has established policies against the execution of both persons
with “mental retardation,” as defined by the American Association of Mental
Retardation,53 and persons who were under the age of 18 at the time of their of-
fenses.54  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
                                                          
48. Sadly, defense attorneys who shrink from rocking the boat locally still may fail, even in this
day and age, to object to jury selection procedures that exclude African Americans from service.  See
Bright, supra note 12, at 1857 (citing Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497-1500 (11th Cir. 1989) (denying
relief in such an instance)).  Cases in which defense attorneys use racial slurs in reference to their cli-
ents are also all too common.  See Bright, supra note 12, at 1865 (citing Transcript of Opening and
Closing Arguments at 39, Record Excerpts at 102, State v. Dungee (11th Cir.) (No. 85-8202), decided
sub nom. Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985) (showing the following opening argument:
“You have got a little ole nigger man over there that doesn’t weigh over 135 pounds.  He is poor and
he is broke.  He’s got an appointed lawyer. . . .  He is ignorant.  I will venture to say he has an IQ of not
over 80.”).  Unsurprisingly, the jury that heard that statement from defense counsel later sentenced the
defendant to death.
49. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1153 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
51. See Tabak, supra note 46.
52. See JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 451-452.
53. See American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1989).
54. See American Bar Ass’n, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Aug. 1983).
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executions in both of those instances.55  While many states now bar executions
of the retarded, other states continue to execute both retarded individuals and,
on [page 15] occasion, offenders who were under 18 at the time they committed
the offenses for which they were executed.56
CONCLUSION
As former American Bar Association  President John J. Curtin, Jr., told a
congressional committee in 1991, “Whatever you think about the death pen-
alty, a system that will take life must first give justice.”57  This recommendation
would not commit the ABA to a policy regarding the morality or the advisabil-
ity of capital punishment per se.  Rather, this Recommendation would reinforce
longstanding Association policies that seek to bring greater fairness to the ad-
ministration of the death penalty.  Those policies rest firmly on the special
competence and experience that only members of the legal profession can bring
to bear.
For many years, the ABA has conducted studies, held educational pro-
grams, and produced studies and law review articles58 about the administration
of the death penalty.  As a result of that work, the Association has identified
numerous, critical flaws in current practices.  Those flaws have not been re-
dressed; indeed, they have become more severe in recent years, and the new
federal habeas law and the defunding of the PCDO’s have compounded these
problems.  This situation requires the specific conclusion of the ABA that exe-
cutions cease, unless and until greater fairness and due process prevail in death
penalty implementation.
                                                          
55. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (refusing to hold that the execution of a mentally
retarded prisoner violated the Eighth Amendment); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)
(refusing to hold that the execution of prisoners who were 16 and 17 years of age at the time of their
offenses violated the Eighth Amendment).
56. See EMILY REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION 39 (1993) (reporting that mentally retarded prisoners account for 12% to
20% of the population on death row); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
95 (1991) (reporting that near the end of 1990 there were 32 death row prisoners who had been under
18 years of age at the time of their offenses); VICTOR STREIB, REPORT (Sept. 19, 1995) (reporting 42
such prisoners only five years later).  Since 1973, 140 death sentences have been imposed on juvenile
offenders.  Letter from the Death Penalty Information Center (Apr. 2, 1996).
57. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 447 (1991).
58. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 14; Symposium, supra note 36; Ronald J. Tabak, Politics and
the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure? ,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239 (1994).
